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
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This is a request for filing a PROVISIONAL APPLICATION FOR PATENT under 37 CFR 1.53 (c).

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<input type="checkbox"/> Additional inventors are being named on the <u>separately numbered sheets attached hereto</u>					
TITLE OF THE INVENTION (280 characters max)					
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Respectfully submitted,  
SIGNATURE

*Robert M. McDermott*  
Robert M. McDermott

Date

16 January 2003

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41-508

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## PREVENTING DISTRIBUTION OF MODIFIED OR CORRUPTED FILES

### TECHNICAL FIELD

This invention relates to the field of computer communications, and in particular to  
5 a method and system for controlling the distribution of modified or corrupted files via a  
distributed communications network.

### BACKGROUND ART

In a distributed communications network, any node in the network may be a source  
10 of information content; as such, the integrity of the information content is questionable. A  
first user may, for example, download a song from a second user's system, and a third user  
may obtain a copy of the song from the first user; a fourth user may obtain a copy from the  
third user, and so on. If the first user's system has a virus that corrupts the contents of the  
file containing the song, the third, fourth, and subsequent users may receive a corrupted  
15 copy of the song, and may transfer this corrupted copy to yet other users. In like manner,  
the first user may have intentionally corrupted the song.

In a typical distributed network, a user identifies which files are available for  
distribution to other users. To facilitate the distribution of such files, an administrator node  
on the network typically provides and maintains a catalog of available files, and their  
20 location in the network. In a song-distribution network, for example, the catalog will  
generally contain the title of the song, the name of the artist, and the node from which this  
song can be downloaded. Often, copies of the same song will be available from a variety of  
nodes. Ideally, because the songs are digitally recorded, each copy of the same song is  
identical. However, if one of the copies is corrupted, or becomes corrupted, it may be  
25 distributed to many users before the problem is discovered, and some of these users may  
offer the as-yet-undiscovered corrupt file as a catalog entry. Thereafter, the integrity of any  
copy of the song from the catalog becomes questionable.

## 2

## DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION

It is an object of this invention to provide a method and system for identifying modified or corrupted information content. It is another object of this invention to provide a method and system for identifying the source of the modification/corruption of the information content. It is another object of this invention to provide a method and system for resolving conflicts regarding whether the information content has been modified/corrupted, and if so, the source of this modification/corruption.

These objects, and others, are achieved by a method and system that includes a detection scheme and a reporting scheme. The original provider of content material to a network binds an identifying code to the material. When the material is received by a target node from a source node, the target node computes an associated code for this received material. If the computed code and the identifying code correspond, the material is determined to be as-provided by the original provider. If the computed code and the identifying code differ, the material is determined to be modified, and a discrepancy report is submitted to an administrator node. In like manner, if the content material is determined to be corrupted, or otherwise different than expected, a discrepancy report is submitted to the administrator node. The administrator node attempts to determine the root source of the modification or corruption, and effects a penalty against the root source if the modification or corruption is confirmed. Optionally, a penalty may be effected against the target node if the discrepancy report is unfounded. The penalties include downgrading of a trustworthiness-measure associated with each node in the network, and these trustworthiness-measures are available for use by potential target nodes in their selection of preferred source nodes.

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## BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an example block diagram of a modification-monitoring system 100 in accordance with this invention.

5 FIGs. 2A-2B illustrate example flow diagrams of a modification-monitoring process in accordance with this invention.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example flow diagram of a conflict-localization process in accordance with this invention.

10 FIG. 4 illustrates an example flow diagram of a conflict-resolution process in accordance with this invention.

Throughout the drawings, the same reference numeral refers to the same element, or an element that performs substantially the same function.

## BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

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This invention is based on the observation that the same information content may be available from a variety of sources within a network, or external to the network. By distinguishing nodes that are more likely to provide corrupted information content, other nodes on the network can be configured to avoid these nodes when seeking to download  
20 new information content, thereby reducing the proliferation of corrupted information content.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example block diagram of a modification-monitoring system 100 in accordance with this invention. A target node 120 initiates a transfer/download of an information file from a source node 110.

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In accordance with this invention, each information file has an associated identifying code that is determined from the content of the information file. This identifying code may be, for example, a control-sum-code (CSC) that is based on a sum of the bytes within the information file, a hash value that is based on a transformation of the bytes within the file, or another parameter whose value is determined by the contents of the  
30 file. Preferably, a one-way code is used, such that the value of the code changes in an unpredictable manner when the contents of the file are modified.

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The identifying code is associated with the information file when the information file is first introduced to the network. If a node in the network creates the information file, the node also creates the identifying code when the information file is created and/or made available to other nodes on the network. Alternatively, if a node in the network imports the information file from an external source, and the external source does not provide the identifying code, the receiving node creates the identifying code when the information file is received and made available to other nodes on the network. Note that, due to a variety of factors, such as sample rate differences, minor length differences, and so on, different recordings or different sources of the same song may have different identifying codes.

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10 Conversely, downloaded digital copies of the same song have identical identifying codes.

When the target node 120 receives the information file and its corresponding identifying code, the target node 120 independently computes a code for the received information file, using the same algorithm that was used to create the original identifying code. If the newly computed code corresponds to the received identifying code, the target node 120 concludes that the information file has not been modified. If, on the other hand, the newly computed code does not correspond to the received identifying code, the target node 120 concludes that the information file has been modified, either at the source node 110, or via the communication channel from the source 110 to the target 120. The target node 120 repeats the above process to distinguish whether the cause of the modification is the communication channel.

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In accordance with this invention, when the target node 120 concludes that the communication channel is not the cause of the discrepancy between the newly computed code and the original identifying code, the target node 120 reports the discrepancy to an administrator node 130 for subsequent actions. The administrator node 130 determines the validity of the reported discrepancy, as detailed below, and penalizes the source node 110 if the source node 110 is deemed to be the cause of the modification to the information file.

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Also in accordance with this invention, if the computed code matches the identifying code, but the target node 120 subsequently discovers a corruption of the information file, such as a song or video with excessive distortion, or a song or video that does not correspond to the title or author associated with the file, or other different-than-

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expected content, the target node 120 reports the discrepancy to the administrator node 130 for subsequent action, as detailed below.

Generally, the penalty imposed by the administrator node is a degradation of a trustworthy-measure associated with the source node 110. Thereafter, other nodes can  
5 access the trustworthy-measure associated with each of the nodes in the network to determine which nodes to use as a source for information files. In a preferred embodiment of this invention, the aforementioned catalog of available files includes this trustworthy-measure for each source, or a rating of each source based on its trustworthy-measure, such a red (danger), yellow (caution), or green (safe) shading of each source icon. Also in a  
10 preferred embodiment, the identifying code from the originating node is also included in the catalog, to facilitate identification of altered identifying codes.

FIGs. 2A-2B illustrate example flow diagrams of a modification-monitoring process in accordance with this invention. FIG. 2A corresponds to the above detailed  
15 example process of a target node 120, and FIG. 2B corresponds to an example process of the administrator node 130. The example process of FIG. 2B illustrates a modification-detection scheme for determining the source of modified material, whereas the example processes of FIGs. 3 and 4 illustrate a conflict-resolution scheme for determining the  
original source of corrupt material.

20 At 210, in FIG. 2A, the target node requests content material from a source node, typically in the form of a computer file. The source node transmits the content material and its identifying code, which are received by the target, at 220. Alternatively, the identifying code may be obtained from the catalog, as discussed above. In this and the following examples, a control-sum-code (CSC) is used as the example identifying code. At 230, the  
25 target computes a corresponding code CSC', and compares it to the identifying code CSC that was received from the source node, or from the catalog, at 232. If these codes CSC, CSC' correspond, the process terminates, at 234. If the codes CSC, CSC' do not correspond, the above process is repeated, at 236, to verify that the difference was not caused by a communication error. When the target determines that the difference was not  
30 caused by a communication error, and therefore implies a distortion of the content at the source node, the target node transmits an error report to an administrator node.

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At 250, in FIG. 2B, the administrator node receives the error report, which identifies the content file, the source, and the code CSC' computed by the reporting target node. The administrator requests the same content from the source, at 260, and receives the content from the source and the original identifying code CSC from either the source or the catalog, at 270. At 280, the administrator independently computes a corresponding verification code CSC" based on the received content, using the same algorithm that was used to create the original code CSC. If, at 285, the newly computed verification code CSC" does not correspond to the original code CSC, the administrator node penalizes the source node, at 290, typically by degrading the trustworthy-measure associated with the source node. Not shown in FIG. 2B, before penalizing the source node, the administrator node may repeat the download process to exclude communication errors, or it may compare its computed verification code CSC" with the computed code CSC' reported by the target node, to verify consistency.

Optionally, at 295, if the newly computed verification code CSC" corresponds to the original identifying code CSC from the source, the administrator node may penalize the reporting target node for filing a false report.

As noted above, a target node may also submit an error report when the target node subsequently discovers that the content of the file is different-than-expected, hereinafter termed "corrupted" content. As above, the error report includes an identification of the source node, an identification of the file, and optionally, the computed identifying code. Presumably, this computed code corresponds to the original identifying code, because otherwise a modification of the file would have been reported, as detailed above. That is, in accordance with this invention, if a node purposely modifies the content of a file, the node will be forced to generate a new identifying code that corresponds to the new/corrupted content, to avoid immediate detection by a target node using the above modification-detection scheme.

Upon receipt of this corruption-error report, the administrator node has two tasks: determining the root source of the reportedly-corrupted file, and determining whether the reportedly-corrupted file is, in fact, corrupt. As noted above, a corrupted file may be widely distributed before the corruption is identified, and, in a conventional system, identifying

the source of corrupt content is extremely difficult. In accordance with the principles of this invention, however, the identifying code facilitates identifying the root source of corrupt content.

5           FIG. 3 illustrates an example flow diagram of a conflict-localization process in accordance with this invention. In FIG. 2B, it is assumed that the administrator merely had to decide whether the target's report was accurate. In reality, the source may have provided content that had been modified/corrupted previously, but not previously detected.

10           In a straight-forward embodiment of this invention, because each differing version of a copy of content material is identified by a different identifying code, the administrator node can find the source of the corrupted version by analyzing prior versions of the catalog, to determine the first supplier of this version of the content material, as identified by the identifying code. Often, however, the administrator node may not be the sole controller of items introduced onto the network, and/or, the administrator may not be  
15           configured to retain an exhaustive knowledge of the history of each published catalog, and/or, the administrator may not be configured to produce the catalog at all.

          In accordance with a second aspect of the invention, the administrator node is configured to explicitly determine the source of a corrupted file, based on somewhat incomplete information. In accordance with this aspect of the invention, the administrator  
20           node notifies the source of the reported corruption, at 320, and awaits a response, at 325. If the source fails to respond within a given time interval, the administrator concludes that the corruption report is true, and penalizes the source. Not illustrated in FIG. 3, if a source admits to having supplied known-corrupt content material, the source is penalized, at 330.

          If the source responds, the source will either concur or disagree with the report.  
25           Generally, when the source concurs with the report, the source also disclaims responsibility for the corruption, and identifies the prior source from which this source obtained the content material, at 340. In effect, the source provides a belated corruption report, identifying the prior source as the source of the corrupted file. The administrator repeats the notification process 320, using this prior source as the new current source. This back-  
30           tracking process 340-320 repeats, with each new source identifying its prior source, until the latest identified source fails to respond, and is penalized, at 330, or until the latest

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identified source disagrees with the reported corruption, at 325, and the administrator must resolve the conflict, at 350. Not illustrated, the administrator is also configured to provide conflict resolution at 350 when the administrator determines that the backtracking process 340-320 enters a continuous loop, wherein the true originator of the corruption falsely represents that a recipient of the corrupted material provided this material.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example flow diagram of a conflict-resolution process in accordance with this invention. At 410, the source may deny being the provider of the content material. In a preferred embodiment of this invention, the administrator has access to prior local regional content catalogs and tables, which identify files offered by each node over time, and the corresponding identifying code. At 420, the administrator checks these catalogs and tables to verify the source's claim of non-ownership. If, at 430, the source had owned the subject content material with the corresponding identifying code, then the source's denial is deemed false, and the source is penalized, at 490; otherwise, the node that reported this source node as the provider of the corrupt content material is optionally penalized, at 495.

Alternatively at 410, the source may dispute the assertion that the content material is corrupted, at which point the administrator effects a reliability check, at 440. The reliability check may address the reliability of the content material, or the reliability of the source node, or both. At 450, the administrator assesses the reliability of the content material. This can be performed by comparing the content material to other copies of the same content material, or, if available, to a known trusted copy of the content material. This assessment may be performed autonomously, if other copies of the content material can be located and a decision reached, or it may be performed with human intervention, wherein the administrator presents the evidence to a human arbitrator who decides whether the evidence is persuasive one way or the other. In the case of a corrupted song or video, for example, the arbitrator is provided the opportunity to hear/view the content.

In an alternative embodiment of this invention, the administrator may purposely distribute known-good content material to nodes of the network, as reliability-testing content. When the administrator receives a report of a distorted copy of this reliability-testing content material, the evidence against the node that first distributes the modified copy is fairly conclusive, justifying a somewhat severe penalty.

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If the content material is found not to be distorted, the administrator optionally penalizes the node that reported the material as distorted, at 495; otherwise, if the content material is found to be distorted, the reported source is penalized, at 490.

At 460, the administrator assesses the reliabilities of the reporter and the source.

5 Generally, this assessment is performed if the administrator is unable to ascertain whether a modification/corruption has actually been made to the original content material, and/or if the determination of the true root-source of the material is inconclusive. In a preferred embodiment of this invention, the administrator is configured to presume that the identified root source has modified the content material. Countering the assumption that the source is  
10 at fault, the administrator also considers other factors, such as the current trustworthy-measures of the source node and the reporting node, the length of time that each of the source and reporting nodes have been part of the network, the amount of traffic handled by each of the source and reporting nodes, and so on.

If the source node is determined to be inherently more reliable than the reporting  
15 node, the reporting node is optionally penalized, at 495; otherwise, the source node is penalized, at 490. Not illustrated, if the administrator is unable to conclusively assess the reliability of the content material or the source node, no penalty actions are taken for the current report.

20 The foregoing merely illustrates the principles of the invention. It will thus be appreciated that those skilled in the art will be able to devise various arrangements which, although not explicitly described or shown herein, embody the principles of the invention and are thus within the spirit and scope of the following claims.

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**CLAIMS:**

1. A method of affecting a trustworthy-measure associated with a source node in a distributed network, comprising:

receiving an information file from the source node and a corresponding identifying code that is based on content of the information file when the information file is introduced to the network,

computing an associated code based on received content of the information file;

comparing the associated code with the identifying code; and

transmitting an error report to an administrator node, identifying the source node and the information file, when at least one of the following occur:

the associated code does not correspond to the identifying code, and

the content of the information file is abnormal;

thereby facilitating a reduction of the trustworthy-measure associated with the source node.

2. The method of claim 1, further including:

repeating the receiving, computing, and comparing steps prior to transmitting the error report.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein

the identifying code includes at least one of:

a control-sum-code, and

a hash-value.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein

the error report includes the associated code and the identifying code.

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5. A method of facilitating control of distribution of modified or corrupted files in a distributed network, comprising:

providing a catalog of available files to nodes of the distributed network, the catalog identifying each file of the available files and a corresponding source node of each file,

processing an error report from a target node that received a downloaded file from a selected source node,

verifying the error report,

degrading a trustworthy-measure of at least one node of the distributed network based on a result of verifying the error report, and

providing the trustworthy-measure of the at least one node to other nodes of the distributed network.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein

the catalog includes a parameter that is based on the trustworthy-measure of each source node.

7. The method of claim 5, wherein

the error report is based on at least one of:

a modification of an original version of the downloaded file, and

an abnormality associated with the downloaded file.

8. The method of claim 5, wherein

verifying the error report is based upon an identifying code corresponding to an original version of the downloaded file.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein

the catalog includes the identifying code.

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10. A method of controlling a trustworthy-measure associated with a source node in a distributed network, comprising:

- receiving, from a reporting node, a report of a modification or corruption of an information file by the source node,
- determining a validity of the report, and
- degrading the trustworthy-measure associated with the source node when the report is determined to be valid.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein

- determining the validity of the report includes:

- receiving, from the source node, the information file and a corresponding identifying code that is based on content of the information file when the information file is introduced to the network,

- computing a verification code based on received content of the information file,

- comparing the verification code with the identifying code.

12. The method of claim 10, further including

- degrading a trustworthy-measure associated with the reporting node when the report is determined to be invalid.

13. The method of claim 10, further including

- allowing the trustworthy-measure to be accessed by other nodes in the distributed network, to influence subsequent requests for material from the source node, based on the trustworthy-measure.

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14. The method of claim 10, wherein

determining the validity of the report includes  
notifying the source node of the report, and  
assessing a response from the source node to determine the validity of the  
report.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein

assessing the response includes:  
determining that the report is valid if the response is a null-response, or an  
admittance of effecting the modification or corruption of the information, and  
revising the report to identify an alternative source of the modification or  
corruption of the information, if the response includes an acknowledgement of the  
modification or corruption.

16. The method of claim 14, wherein

assessing the response includes  
assessing the reliability of at least one of:  
the information file,  
the source node, and  
the reporting node.

17. The method of claim 10, wherein

determining the validity of the report includes determining a reliability of the  
source node, and  
determining the reliability of the source node is based on at least one of:  
the trustworthy-measure of the source node,  
longevity of the source node within the distributed network,  
traffic flow via the source node, and  
prior activities of the source node.

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18. The method of claim 17, wherein

determining the validity of the report also includes determining a reliability of the reporting node, and

determining the reliability of the reporting node is based on at least one of:

the trustworthy-measure of the reporting node,

longevity of the reporting node within the distributed network,

traffic flow via the reporting node, and

prior activities of the reporting node.

19. The method of claim 10, wherein

determining the validity of the report includes a verification of prior ownership of the information file.

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20. A communications network, comprising:

a plurality nodes, including at least a source node, a target node, and an administrator node,

the source node having an information file and a corresponding identifying code based on content of the information file at a prior point in time,

the target node being configured to:

receive the information file and identifying code,

transmit a discrepancy report based on at least one of:

a discrepancy between the identifying code and a computed code based on received content of the information file, and

an abnormality in the information file, and

the administrator node being configured to:

receive the discrepancy report, and

modify a trustworthy-measure associated with at least one node of the plurality of nodes, based on the discrepancy report.

21. The communications network of claim 20, wherein

the administrator node is further configured to verify the discrepancy report prior to modifying the trustworthy-measure.

22. The communications network of claim 21, wherein

the administrator node is configured to verify the discrepancy report by:

receiving the information file from the source node, and

determining a verification code based on received content of the information file, and

comparing the verification code to the identifying code.

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23. The communications network of claim 21, wherein

the administrator node is configured to verify the discrepancy report based on at least one of:

- a reliability of the received content of the information file,
- a record of prior ownership of the information file,
- a reliability of the source node,
- a reliability of the reporting node,
- a longevity of the source node within the network,
- a longevity of the reporting node within the network,
- prior activities of the source node within the network, and
- prior activities of the reporting node within the network.

24. The communications network of claim 23, wherein

the trustworthy-measure of the source node is available for access by each of the plurality of nodes, to facilitate control of subsequent distribution of files from the source node based on the trustworthy-measure.

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25. An administrator node in a communications network comprising a plurality nodes, that is configured to:

- receive a discrepancy report from a reporting node, the discrepancy report identifying a source node and an information file,

- verify the discrepancy report, and

- modify a trustworthy-measure associated at least one node of the plurality of nodes, based on whether the discrepancy report is valid.

26. The administrator node of claim 25, wherein

- the discrepancy report is based on a comparison of a code computed by the reporting node to an identifying code corresponding to contents of the information file at a prior time,

- the administrator node is configured to verify the discrepancy report by:

- receiving the information file from the source node, and

- determining a verification code based on received content of the information file, and

- comparing the verification code to the identifying code.

27. The administrator node of claim 25, wherein

- the administrator node is configured to verify the discrepancy report based on at least one of:

- a reliability of the received content of the information file,

- a record of prior ownership of the information file,

- a reliability of the source node,

- a reliability of the reporting node,

- a longevity of the source node within the network,

- a longevity of the reporting node within the network,

- prior activities of the source node within the network, and

- prior activities of the reporting node within the network.

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28. The administrator node of claim 25, wherein

the administrator node is further configured to  
provide a catalog that identifies a plurality of information files and  
corresponding source nodes.

29. The administrator node of claim 28, wherein

the catalog further includes a parameter based on the trustworthy-measure of the at  
least one node.

**PREVENTING DISTRIBUTION OF MODIFIED OR CORRUPTED FILES****ABSTRACT**

An administrator node (130) adjusts a trustworthy-measure associated with nodes (110) that are suspected of unauthorized modifications of content material. The original provider of the content material to a network binds an identifying code to the material. When the material is received by a target node (120) from a source node (110), the target node (120) computes an associated code for this received material. If the computed code and the identifying code correspond, the material is determined to be as provided by the original provider. If the computed code and the identifying code differ, the material is determined to be modified, and a discrepancy report is submitted to the administrator node (130). If the computed code and the identifying code correspond, and the material is corrupted, a discrepancy report is also submitted. The administrator node (130) attempts to determine the root source of the modification or corruption, and effects a penalty against the root source if the modification is confirmed. Optionally, a penalty may be effected against the target node (120) if the discrepancy report is unfounded. The penalties include downgrading of the trustworthiness-measure associated with each node, and these trustworthiness-measures are available for use by potential target nodes in their selection of preferred source nodes.

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


FIG. 1




FIG. 2A




FIG. 2B

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


FIG. 3




FIG. 4